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On the morning of 14 July 2008, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), submitted a request to the judges of the pre-trial chamber to issue an 
arrest warrant against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. Later in the day, Moreno-Ocampo 
held a press conference, where he presented evidence alleging that al-Bashir had committed 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur. In the words of the Prosecutor, Al-
Bashir had “masterminded and implemented a plan to destroy in substantial part the Fur, Masalit, 
and Zaghawa groups, on account of their ethnicity […] His alibi was a ‘counterinsurgency.’ His 
intent was genocide.”1  Moreno-Ocampo’s announcement provoked contradictory reactions in 
Sudan and in other parts of the world. Human rights activists saluted his courage and praised 
his move as a milestone in fi ghting impunity and deterring crimes in the future. Humanitarian 
workers and peacekeepers worked in fear of targeted attacks, even as the UN immediately 
evacuated its ‘non-essential’ staff from Darfur. Those in charge of relaunching the Darfur peace 
negotiations and others interested in the continuation of the North-South peace process invoked 
doomsday scenarios, portraying the ICC as an insurmountable obstacle to peace in Sudan. Arab 
and African heads of states rallied behind Al-Bashir, castigating Moreno-Ocampo’s decision as an 
attack on the principle of sovereignty or, more bluntly, as an act of Western neo-imperialism. 
The reaction to the likely ICC indictment of President al-Bashir stands as a microcosm for the 
international response to the Darfur crisis: there is a lot of noise and there are many actors with 
good intentions, but their interests and strategies differ so starkly that their combined voices 
appear incoherent and ultimately cancel each other out. Indeed, despite the reluctance in the 
Arab world, the Darfur confl ict has triggered an international response that eclipses all other 
confl icts in Africa: the world’s largest humanitarian operation takes place in Darfur; the largest 
and most expensive peacekeeping mission is currently being deployed; a plethora of special 
envoys and mediators have been appointed to make peace in Darfur; the Darfur confl ict has 
generated a highly infl uential advocacy movement; for the fi rst time, the U.S. government has 
declared the ongoing confl ict as genocide and permitted the UN Security Council to refer a case 
to the ICC. In a sense, Darfur is the antithesis of Samantha Power’s criticism that mass atrocities 
and genocide are considered ‘a problem from hell,’ with people and politicians preferring to 
look away when they are being committed.2 Despite all the attention, however, the Darfur 
confl ict appears further than ever from resolution. This paper attempts to get to the heart of 
this paradox. It fi rst distinguishes fi ve dimensions of the international response to the Darfur 
confl ict: delivering aid, negotiating peace, enforcing peace, promoting justice, and securing the 
‘New Sudan.’ It then considers synergies and contradictions between these dimensions. The aim 
is to contribute to a pragmatic assessment of international efforts to end the confl ict in Darfur 
and, more generally, to sharpen perceptions about opportunity costs in confl ict management.
1 ‘ICC Prosecutor presents case against Sudanese President, Hassan Ahmad AL BASHIR, for genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes in Darfur’, ICC, 14 July 2008. Available from: http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/406.html   
2 Power, S., A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, New York: Harper Perennial, 2003  
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Five dimensions of the international response 
to the Darfur confl ict 
While both the Arab League and Arab public opinion remained largely silent, the Darfur confl ict 
provoked a strong response in the West, with a multitude of actors getting involved in trying 
to ‘manage’ the confl ict in Darfur. Their common denominator is that they are inspired by 
humanistic ideals and motivated by a genuine humanitarian impulse, a desire to do something 
to mitigate the suffering of Darfurians and to aid the resolution of the Darfur confl ict in the long 
run. However, these actors differ in terms of their perspective on the confl ict, their interests, 
their worldview, and the activities and strategies they pursue to bring sustainable peace to 
Darfur. Broadly speaking, fi ve strategies can be distinguished.
Delivering aid
Humanitarian organisations were quick to respond to the Darfur crisis. In early 2004, they set 
up a massive operation geared towards delivering aid to the victims of violence, particularly in 
camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs). Today, roughly 13,000 humanitarian workers and 
one hundred relief agencies work in Darfur, making it the largest humanitarian operation in the 
world. As a result, mortality rates have been reduced to pre-war levels in many areas and the 
overall health situation has improved, although it remains fragile.3 Humanitarians see Darfur 
through a pragmatic lens, as they try to function effectively in an environment fraught with tricky 
operational, political and ethical dilemmas. Their aim is to help the neediest, while avoiding as 
far as possible the pitfalls of humanitarian assistance that can cause harm. The default option 
for humanitarian organisations is political neutrality, which means that they are careful not 
to express opinions or carry out activities that confl icting parties perceive as biased. It is true 
that political neutrality is something of a myth and that humanitarians have sometimes become 
intermingled with dubious politics in the past.4 However, in Darfur, humanitarian agencies have 
generally been careful not to express explicit positions on delicate issues such as humanitarian 
intervention, the peace process, or the deployment of UN peacekeepers. This does not mean 
that they have condoned violations; on the contrary, many organisations have protested against 
destructive government policies such as attempts to forcibly repatriate IDPs or the use of rape 
as a weapon of war5 – but the humanitarians have generally abstained from the grand politics 
surrounding the Darfur confl ict.
Negotiating peace
Within months of the escalation of the Darfur confl ict in early 2003, attempts were made to 
bring Darfur rebel movements and the Sudanese government to the negotiating table. After an 
unsuccessful ceasefi re agreement signed in N’Djamena in April 2004, the parties met in Abuja, 
Nigeria for comprehensive peace talks mediated by the African Union (AU) and supported by 
many Western states. As a result of intense pressure, one of the three principal rebel factions, 
as well as the government, signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006.6 However, 
the DPA was never implemented and arguably made matters worse on the ground.7 The AU, 
together with the UN, tried to relaunch the Darfur peace process in summer 2007, but to no 
avail. The basic premise of mediators is that the Darfur confl ict is a product of the skewed 
centre-periphery dynamics in Sudan and the historic marginalisation of Darfur associated with 
3  Weissman,  F. , ‘Humanitarian Dilemmas in Darfur’, June 2008. Available from:   
http://msf.fr/drive/214a9aa0483c6e560e05cdafb00beb11.pdf 
4 For a damning criticism of the politics of humanitarianism, see Rieff , D., A Bed for the Night, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002
5 Weissman, 2008, op. cit.
6 Nathan, L., ‘No Ownership, No Peace: The Darfur Peace Agreement’, Working Paper, LSE Crisis States Research Centre, 
September 2006. Available from http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP5.2.pdf
7 Lanz, D., ‘Complicating Darfur’ - review of de Waal, A. (ed.), War in Darfur and the Search for Peace, 2007 - in Fletcher Forum of 
World Aff airs, Vol. 32, no. 1, 2008, pp. 213-219. Available from http://fl etcher.tufts.edu/forum/archives/pdfs/32-1pdfs/Lanz.pdf
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it. Thus, peace can be achieved by engaging the political and military elites of Darfur alongside 
the regime in Khartoum in order to fi nd a compromise that satisfi es the underlying interests of 
both parties. The North-South peace process and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 
January 2005 serve as a model in this regard. Peacemakers work to build a reputation as trusted 
intermediaries of the confl ict parties and are therefore sceptical about the accusatory discourse 
of Darfur advocates. In their view, the demonisation of the Sudanese government by human 
rights activists and the ICC is particularly unhelpful.
Enforcing peace
Galvanised by the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide in April 2004, an infl uential 
Darfur advocacy campaign emerged in North America and later in Europe.8 The analogy between 
Rwanda and Darfur was very dominant from the outset, and many advocates saw Darfur as a 
test of whether or not the international community had learned its lesson in terms of bearing 
silent witness to another ongoing genocide.9 Darfur was equally considered a test case for the 
‘responsibility to protect,’ a concept promoted by liberal internationalists which permits the 
use of force in situations when the humanitarian benefi ts of an intervention clearly outweigh its 
costs.10 Consequently, there were strong calls for the use of military power to stop the confl ict 
in Darfur. Maximalists like Eric Reeves demanded an intervention similar to NATO’s operation 
in Kosovo, one that would go beyond Darfur and bring regime change in Khartoum.11 Others 
were more pragmatic and focused their efforts on the deployment of a robust UN peacekeeping 
mission with a strong mandate to protect civilians. What they have in common is the belief 
that peace in Darfur is possible through military means, and that there is a moral imperative 
to intervene that trumps the principle of sovereignty as well as traditional considerations of 
national interest. Evidently, a NATO intervention did not materialize and it took two years of 
fi erce campaigning to get UN peacekeepers on the ground.12 Finally, in July 2007 the Security 
Council established the hybrid AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to replace the discredited 
AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). UNAMID has a relatively strong, albeit ambiguous mandate. At full 
strength UNAMID will have 20,000 troops and 6,000 additional police and civilian personnel. 
However, due to different logistical and political problems, only 10,000 peacekeepers have 
been deployed so far.
Promoting justice
Advocates and human rights activists also spearheaded a campaign to ensure justice and 
accountability for crimes committed in Darfur. From an early stage, they lobbied to get the 
situation in Darfur recognised as genocide.13 Thus, in July 2004, the U.S. Congress called Darfur 
a genocide, followed by a similar declaration two months later by the then Secretary of State 
Colin Powell. Around the same time, the UN Security Council charged a Commission of Inquiry 
8 For a critical appraisal of the Darfur advocacy movement, see Haeri, M., ‘Saving Darfur: Does Advocacy Help or Hinder 
Confl ict Resolution?’ , The Fletcher Journal of Human Security, Praxis, Vol. 13, 2008, pp. 33-46
9 Brunk, D., ‘Dissecting Darfur: Anatomy of a Genocide Debate’, International Relations, Vol. 22, no. 1, 2008, pp. 25-44
10 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, Ottawa: International 
Development Research Centre, September 2001. Available at: http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp
11 See e.g. Reeves, E., ‘Regime Change in Sudan’, The Washington Post, 23 August 2004. Available from: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25073-2004Aug22.html 
12 Van der Lijn, J.,  ‘To Paint the Nile Blue: Factors of Success and Failure of UNMIS and UNAMID’,  The Hague: Clingendael Institute 
and Radbound University Nijmegen, 2008. Available from http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2008/20080100_cscp_paper_
lijn.pdf 
13 For debates surrounding the determination of the Darfur confl ict as genocide, see Mamdani, M., ‘The Politics of Naming: 
Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency’ in London Review of Books, 8 March 2007. Available from http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n05/print/
mamd01_.html. See also Cohen, R., ‘Darfur Debated’ in Forced Migration Review, Issue 29, 2007. Available from www.fmreview.
org/FMRpdfs/FMR29/55-57.pdf. Another interesting case of the entanglement of law and politics in the context of genocide is the 
rift between Rwanda and France, exacerbated by the accusations in French and Rwandan tribunals against senior political leaders 
of the respective countries. See, e.g., Braeckman, C., ‘Accusations suspectes contre le régime rwandais’ in Le monde diplomatique. 
January 2007. Available from http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2007/01/BRAECKMAN/14367
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led by the eminent international jurist Antonio Cassese to determine whether genocide had 
occurred in Darfur. The Commission conducted various fi eld trips and concluded in its fi nal 
report of January 2005 that there was no proof that the Sudanese government had pursued a 
genocidal policy, but that the crimes committed in Darfur were “no less serious and heinous 
than genocide.”14 One of Cassese’s recommendations was to refer the situation in Darfur to the 
ICC – the Security Council followed suit in March 2005, after intense lobbying to overcome the 
U.S.’ initial opposition.15 Thus, in May 2007, the ICC issued arrest warrants against the former 
Sudanese Minister of Interior Ahmed Harun and the militia leader Ali Kushayb,16 followed by the 
Prosecutor’s recent charges against President al-Bashir. Human rights activists and international 
criminal lawyers tend to have an ethnic view of the Darfur confl ict. They see the non-Arab 
tribes of Darfur as the victims of a deliberate campaign of extermination planned by the Arab 
regime in Khartoum and carried out by Arab tribal militia in Darfur, the infamous Janjaweed. 
For them, much like for advocates of humanitarian intervention, Darfur is a test case for a new 
global order based on the international rule of law, where crimes are systematically pursued 
and consequently deterred. They further see justice as a pre-requisite for sustainable peace. 
Unless perpetrators are removed from power and held accountable, the past properly dealt 
with, and victims compensated, confl icts will come to the fore again, in Darfur and elsewhere. 
Thus, justice activists can be sceptical of peace negotiations, especially when the cynical price 
for peace appears to be appeasing perpetrators and abandoning justice for the victims.
Securing the ‘New Sudan’ 
When the Darfur confl ict broke out in 2003, peace talks to end the 20-year North-South war 
between al-Bashir’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and John Garang’s Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) were underway in Naivasha, Kenya. Darfur and Darfurians were 
largely excluded from the talks, and some authors have argued that this initial ignorance 
refl ected a sensitivity within the UN and many states not “to rock the boat” by criticising 
the NCP for what was happening in Darfur.17 However, not all arguments in favour of giving 
priority to the Naivasha talks and, later, of the implementation of the CPA, are tantamount to 
neglecting Darfur. To the contrary, there are some UN members of staff, diplomats, members 
of the SPLM, and Sudanese politicians and academics, who share a genuine concern for Darfur, 
while stressing that peace in Darfur depends on the success of the CPA. They see the Darfur 
confl ict in a national Sudanese context: the marginalisation of Darfur and other regions can only 
be remedied if peace takes root in the whole of Sudan. The CPA provides both a blueprint and 
a roadmap for a democratic ‘New Sudan,’ where political power and wealth is shared equitably 
between the centre and the peripheries.18 Thus, international efforts to build peace in Sudan 
must focus on the continuation of the North-South peace process and the implementation of the 
CPA, in particular the smooth organisation of the elections in 2009. Confl ict management efforts 
that treat Darfur outside of its Sudanese context can be counter-productive.
14 ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General’, pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, 25 January 2005. Available from http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_
darfur.pdf   
15 Kaufman, Z., ‘Justice in Jeopardy: Accountability for the Darfur Atrocities’, Criminal Law Forum, Vol. 16, 2005, pp. 343-360
16 For an interesting account of the politics surrounding the ICC before the charges against al-Bashir, see de Waal, A.,
‘Darfur, the Court and Khartoum: The Politics of State Non-Cooperation’ in Waddell, N. and P. Clark (eds.), Courting Confl ict? Justice, 
Peace and the ICC in Africa, London: Royal African Society, March 2008. Available from: 
http://www.crisisstates.com/download/others/ICC%20in%20Africa.pdf.
17 Prunier, G., The Ambiguous Genocide, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007
18 Azzain Mohammed, A., ‘The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Darfur’ in de Waal, A. (ed.), War in Darfur, op. cit, pp. 199-
213.
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Synergies and contradictions between dimensions of the 
international response to the Darfur confl ict
At fi rst sight, the synergies between different confl ict management strategies in Darfur seem 
obvious. The huge attention to the Darfur confl ict generated by advocacy groups undoubtedly 
contributes to mobilizing resources to sustain the world’s most expensive humanitarian 
and peacekeeping operations as well as political capital to leverage peace negotiations. 
Furthermore, in theory, there seems to be a functional complimentarity between different 
approaches: humanitarians contribute to de-escalating armed confl ict through aid delivery, 
allowing mediators to facilitate a peace process, which will eventually result in a peace 
agreement. Peacekeepers subsequently implement the peace agreement, while international 
lawyers manage transitional justice, which contributes to popular buy-in and to functioning 
local justice mechanisms. Successful peacebuilding in one area then spills over to the rest of the 
country and the region, providing momentum for other peace processes. Evidently, the reality 
of confl ict management is much more complicated and messy, Darfur being the quintessential 
example. There are undoubtedly synergies between different confl ict management strategies, 
but there are also important contradictions and dilemmas. The following section briefl y outlines 
fi ve contradictions in terms of confl ict management in Darfur: peace vs. justice, good vs. good, 
military vs. political resolution, Darfur vs. the rest, and symptoms vs. causes.
Peace vs. justice
The establishment of war crimes tribunals since the end of the Cold War has provoked a debate 
about whether the pursuit of justice in times of war hinders efforts to make peace between 
warring parties. In 1996, an anonymous writer in the Human Rights Quarterly famously criticised 
the role of the human rights community and the The Hague tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: 
“thousands of people are dead who should have been alive – because moralists were in the 
quest of the perfect peace.” The writer also added: “if one wanted peace, then one had 
to accept the principle that whatever the parties could agree to freely was acceptable to 
the peace negotiators.”19 This anonymous statement seems exaggerated, but it does reveal 
a tension between peace and justice, between providing warring parties with incentives to 
stop fi ghting and trying them in war crimes courts.20 The genocide charges against Sudanese 
President al-Bashir raise similar questions and have sparked heated debates. Some observers 
fear that al-Bashir and his ruling clique now have nothing to lose and will expel peacekeepers 
and humanitarians and escalate violence against civilians in Darfur. Others are more optimistic 
and hope that by exerting pressure through the ICC, the Sudanese government will become 
more cooperative.21 However, there is no denying that the indictment against al-Bashir will 
have a negative impact on opportunities in terms of peacemaking. It will be more diffi cult 
for countries and organisations to get involved in the Darfur peace process and to assist in 
negotiating a peace settlement with the Sudanese government. It will also be harder to offer 
peace incentives to al-Bashir because the ICC indictments remain, whether he signs a peace 
agreement or not. Finally, the indictments divide the international community, Arab and African 
states being predominantly critical, while the West supports the ICC.
19 Anonymous, ‘Human Rights in Peace Negotiations’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 18, no. 2, 1996, pp. 249-258, at 252 and 258.
20 For details see Lanz, D., ‘Of Peace and Justice: The Impact of Human Rights in Peacemaking’, Medford, MA: The Fletcher School of 
Law and Diplomacy, 2008. Available from:  http://ginn.fl etcher.tufts.edu/mald/2007/lanz.pdf
21 For an overview, see de Waal, A., ‘Sudan and the ICC: A Guide to the Controversy’, 11 July 2008. Available from:
 http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/darfur/2008/07/11/sudan-and-the-icc-a-guide-to-the-controversy/
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“Good vs. good”22 
Tensions arose between humanitarian organisations and advocacy groups over the latter’s call 
for military intervention in Darfur. The humanitarians, on the one hand, were anxious that the 
interventionist rhetoric of advocates in the U.S. would frighten the Sudanese government and 
lead it to retaliate by targeting relief organisations and by restricting humanitarian access in 
Darfur. There are also fears that calling for a ‘humanitarian’ intervention could jeopardise the 
core principle of humanitarian organisations, i.e. their neutrality. Darfur advocates, on the 
other hand, have criticised humanitarian operations for prolonging the suffering of Darfurians, 
without offering sustainable solutions. They argue that there is no point putting “a Band-Aid on 
a cancer”23 – instead, they argue that intervention is required to tackle the root cause of the 
confl ict, that is, the genocidal policy of the Sudanese government.
Military vs. political resolution
Calls for humanitarian intervention in Darfur also affect peace negotiations. Alex de Waal, a 
long-time Sudan expert and member of the AU mediation team in Abuja, has pointed to two 
perverse effects of the responsibility to protect in Darfur. First, it has distorted the views 
of Darfur rebel movements and encouraged them to make unrealistic demands, out of sync 
with their actual military and political power. For example, one rebel leader, Abdelwahid al-
Nur, alluding to the intervention of NATO in the Balkans, told the mediators in Abuja that he 
would only sign a peace agreement if he got “a guarantee for implementation like in Bosnia.”24 
Thus, the responsibility to protect has fostered maximalist positions and allowed the rebels 
to hide behind the prospect of foreign military intervention, without seriously working on a 
political settlement. Second, the insistence of advocacy groups on peace enforcement made 
the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force the fi rst priority of the U.S. and other states.25 
Therefore, they wanted a peace agreement fast and used ‘deadline diplomacy’ to bring the 
Abuja talks to a premature end – they consequently deprived the parties of their ownership of 
the process and produced a peace agreement, the DPA, that lacked popular support and was not 
signed by all rebel factions.26 
Darfur vs. the rest
The Darfur confl ict has received massive amounts of publicity and, consequently, more resources 
were spent on confl ict management in Darfur than in most other confl icts. Some observers think 
that the attention and funds given to Darfur – for relief operations, UNAMID, Darfur peace talks, 
the ICC – are crowding out resources for managing other confl icts. Thus, there is a perception 
within Sudan that the implementation of the CPA is being neglected because the actors with 
the strongest leverage focus on Darfur. After his resignation as U.S. Special Envoy in Sudan, 
Andrew Natsios has pointedly and repeatedly pleaded for a refocusing of international attention 
on the North-South peace process and the elections. A failure to do so increases the risk of a 
collapse of the CPA, which could destabilise the whole of Sudan, including Darfur. Therefore, 
treating the Darfur confl ict separately and neglecting its national dimension, be it in the realm 
22 This section is based on Rieff , D., ‘Good vs. good in Darfur’ in Los Angeles Times, 24 June 2007. Available from http://articles.
latimes.com/2007/jun/24/opinion/op-rieff 24
23 Rieff , 2007, op. cit.
24 Quoted in de Waal, A., ‘I will not Sign’ in London Review of Book, 30 November 2006. Available from http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/
n23/waal01_.html
25 De Waal, A., ‘Dilemmas of Multiple Priorities and Multiple Instruments: the Darfur Crisis’ in Accord, Issue 19, 2008. Available from 
http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/incentives/darfur_1.php
26 Nathan, 2006, op. cit. 
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of peacekeeping, mediation or aid, is a potential boomerang that could come back and undo 
progress in Darfur and elsewhere.27 Natsios also warns of the ramifi cations of the ICC indictments 
against President al-Bashir on the national level: the ruling clique within the NCP is now more 
desperate to cling to its power and is therefore less likely to accept free and fair elections as 
foreseen by the CPA.28 
Symptoms vs. causes
Relief agencies are credited for successfully stabilising the humanitarian situation in Darfur 
to the extent that mortality rates in some areas are lower today than they were before the 
war. This is all the more notable considering the dangerous environment that humanitarians 
operate in. However, this development should be considered within the prism of a fundamental 
critique of the humanitarian enterprise in Darfur and elsewhere. Namely, if armed confl ict is 
a disease, then humanitarian aid alleviates its symptoms without tackling its causes. Worse, 
fi ghting symptoms may mean that the treatment of causes becomes more diffi cult in the long-
run. Indeed, there is a concern that humanitarian aid has entrenched the Darfur confl ict. Aid 
has had far-reaching consequences on Darfurian society and contributed to its urbanisation 
whereby one third of the population now live in IDP camps in the proximity of towns and cities. 
Land abandoned by IDPs has been taken over by other groups; displacement has fostered the 
emergence of a new leadership structure and marginalised many traditional leaders; camps 
also breed a new generation of Darfurians that grow up in a very poor and highly politicised 
environment.29 All of these factors make it diffi cult to resolve the Darfur confl ict in the long-
run, even if a compromise is found between the rebels and the Sudanese government within the 
next few years.
Conclusion
Darfur is located in one of the remotest regions of the world, and yet ordinary people from 
all over the globe have heard the call to “save Darfur.” They know that a horrifi c confl ict 
has claimed the lives of tens of thousands and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. 
Many of them think that the international community has once again failed to respond to the 
crisis, just like in Rwanda ten years before. Yet, the reality is different. There has been a far-
reaching and multi-faceted response to the Darfur crisis – but it has not been effective. Perhaps 
our expectations are too high to start with – civil wars in Africa tend to have multi-layered, 
extremely complex structural causes, which cannot be simply resolved through the intervention 
of external actors. However, the fact remains that despite the very substantial resources that 
have been spent on confl ict management in Darfur, little has been achieved, save perhaps the 
stabilisation of the humanitarian situation. The image that comes to mind is that external actors 
in Darfur have one foot on the gas and the other one on the break: the most powerful states 
lobbied for the establishment of the world’s largest UN peacekeeping operation, but the mission 
is now unable to obtain the equipment it needs to operate effectively in Darfur; the situation in 
27 Natsios, A., ‘Beyond Darfur: Sudan’s Slide Toward Civil War’, in Foreign Aff airs, 2008. Available from http://www.foreignaff airs.
org/20080501faessay87306/andrew-s-natsios/beyond-darfur.html
28 Natsios, A., ‘A Disaster in the Making’, 12 July 2008. Available from http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/darfur/2008/07/12/a-disaster-in-
the-making/
29 Weissman, 2008, op. cit. 
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Darfur was referred to the ICC by the Security Council, even though the permanent members are 
not willing to enforce the arrest warrants. Hopes for peace concentrated on the talks in Abuja, 
only to be abruptly brought to an end because its supporters needed to quickly produce a peace 
agreement and so on and so forth.
There are no simple solutions for the contradictions outlined above – they represent complicated 
dilemmas and tricky trade-offs. It would be naïve to call for more coordination among external 
actors in Darfur, as the difference of their approaches is structural and refl ects their respective 
interests and contexts. There are, however, two lessons that we can learn. The fi rst is that 
resources are scarce and effective confl ict management requires priorities. It is not possible to 
simultaneously run a humanitarian operation, deploy peacekeepers, try the Sudanese President 
in an international court, negotiate a peace agreement, and foster the democratic transition of 
Sudan. We need to think about what is most important and concentrate our resources – money, 
political capital, personnel – to achieve this objective. The second lesson is that actors working 
in or on confl ict, whatever approach they take, must be aware that their decisions and actions 
have opportunity costs and that they can “do harm.” As David Kennedy writes, “the darker sides 
can swamp the benefi ts of humanitarian work, and well-intentioned people can fi nd themselves 
unwittingly entrenching the very things they have sought voice to denounce.”30 Also, those 
involved in the grand scheme of managing confl ict Darfur must realise that they are in essence 
projecting their morals and a Western political agenda and that, consequently, their good 
intentions may not be perceived as such, especially in the Arab world. Indeed, moving from self-
centred and self-righteous dogmatism to a pragmatic assessment of causes and consequences 
would be a big step, and it would certainly improve our ability to manage confl icts in Darfur 
and elsewhere.
30 Kennedy, D., The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004, 
pp. xiii-xiv.
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